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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
period; it also provided for a six-month notice of sale instead of the previous
six-week notice. It was held that the law was merely procedural in nature,
not taking from the mortgagee his remedy, but merely altering the remedy of
enforcement. The Legislature has the power to repeal, amend, change or modify
the proceedings in court, both as to past and future contracts, as long as the
parties are left with a substantial remedy. Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (1843)
Tennessee v. Snead, 96 U.S. 69, 24 L. Ed. 610 (1877).
FRANK J. ANTOINE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POLICE POWER-PR cE FIxING.-A law passed by the
New York state legislature (Laws of 1933, c. 158) declared that the milk indus-
try was one of paramount importance to the people of the state; that a present
emergency existed in the industry; and founded a control board with the power
to license dealers and fix minimum prices. The statute also provided a criminal
sanction for violation. A dealer sold milk for a price lower than that fixed by
the control board and was criminally prosecuted for the violation. The defense
brought the constitutionality of the law into question. Held, the law is constitu-
tional. People of New York v. Nebbia, 262 N.Y. 259, 186 N.E. 694 (1933).
The police power of the state may be invoked to regulate an industry only
when the industry is of primary importance, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L.Ed. 747 (1931), or when there is an emergency
situation. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, et al., 256 U.S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct.
465, 65 L. Ed. 877 (1920).; Black v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65
L. Ed. 865, 16 A.L.R. 165 (1920). The police power itself is concerned with
protecting the lives, health, comfort and peace of all persons and of all property
within the state, Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Finley, 38 Kan. 550, 16 P. 951 (1888),
and the 14th Amendment does not interfere with the exercise of this power
in a reasonable way for such purposes. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678,
8 Sup. Ct. 992, 22 L. Ed. 253 (1887).
What constitutes an industry which is sufficiently related to the public inter-
est to warrant its regulation by the state is not limited to any fixed set of
characteristics or facts. "Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so
differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in
other places would be a matter of purely private concern." Block v. Hirsch,
supra.
The field of regulation has spread from the more traditional "public utili-
ties" into a variety of industries, for example; bill boards, St. Louis Poster Advt.
Co. v. City of St. Louis, et al., 246 U.S. 269, 39 Sup. Ct. 274, 63 L. Ed. 599
(1918) ; rents during an emergency in housing facilities, Block v. Hirsch, supra;
insurance rates, German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 34 Sup.
Ct. 612, 56 L. Ed. 1011, L.R.A. 1915 C (1913) ; cotton gins, W. A. Frost v. Corpo-
ration Co-nzimission of the State of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515, 49 Sup Ct. 235,
73 L. Ed. 983 (1928); hours worked by miners, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,
18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780 (1897). The New York court justified the regula-
tion of the price of milk on two grounds. First, that the continuous supply of
wholesome milk to the cities is vital to the public welfare. Cf. People v. Chris
Teuscher, 248 N.Y. 454, 162 N.E. 484 (1928). Second, that the low prices paid
to milk producers resulted in unrest and dissatisfaction which amounted to an
emergency. The continuity of supply or the price at which a commodity is sold
is not important enough to the public welfare to justify regulation. Wolff Pack-
ing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed.
RECENT DECISIONS
1103, 27 A.L.R. 1280 (1922). By the declaration of the emergency the court takes
the control of milk out of this class.
The use of the police power must be reasonable and necessary, connected
directly with the public welfare. Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539,
49 L. Ed. 937 (1904). Any interference with private rights which is unreasonable
and unneeded is deprivation of property without due process of law and is void
under the 14th Amendment. State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. Ed.
146 (1872). The ;mere declaration by the legislature that a given industry is of
public concern is not sufficient to make it so. It is subject to judicial review.
Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718, 58 A.L.R.
1236 (1926) ; Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra. The
courts will follow the judgment of the legislature as far as possible wherever
the statute aims to stimulate the production of a vital food by price fixing, and
will interpret it liberally according to the purpose of the legislature. Austin v.
City of New Court, 258 N.Y. 113, 179 N.E. 313 (1921).
The court distinguished between the control of the price of milk and the
control of the number of ice plants in Oklahoma, New State Ice. Co. v. Lieb-
man, supra, on the grounds that the Oklahoma statute tended to set up mon-
opolies which the New York statute does not do.
CAROLINE AGGER.
C010RATIONS-CoMPENSATION OF O1 Ics-BoNuSEs.-Plaintiff brought ac-
tion as a minority stockholder to have defendants, officers of the corporation,
account for amounts paid them under a 1912 by-law authorizing the diversion
to six senior officers of ten per cent of any annual profits in excess of those
realized in 1910, and that such payments be enjoined. It was shown the capital
of the company since 1910 had more than doubled; profits had increased five-
fold; that under this by-law over ten million dollars had been distributed to the
executives since 1921; that in 1930 the president received a cash bonus of more
than $842,000 in addition to a stipulated salary of $168,000 and "special credits"
of $273,470; that the directors, to insure continuance of employees' zeal, put
through several stock subscription plans, the benefits of which had accrued in
large part to the inaugurators, the plans being at no time revealed to the stock-
holders; inter alia. In March, 1931, after a demand for an accounting to the
company and a refusal to comply, plaintiff brought suit in the Supreme Court of
New York; thereafter the suit was removed to the federal court for the South-
ern District of New York whose temporary injunction was reversed with direc-
tion to dismiss the suit by the Cicuit Court of Appeals. [60 F. (2d) 109 (C.C.A.
2d, 1932]. On writ of certiorari. Held, reversed. The by-law could not be used
to justify payments to the officers of sums so large as in substance and effect
to amount of spoilation or waste of corporate property, over the protest of a
stockholder, and the lower court is warranted to determine whether and to what
extent such payments constituted misuse and waste. Rogers v. Hill, et al., 53 Sup.
Ct. 731, 77 L. Ed. 945 (1933).
A bonus is not a gift or gratuity, but a sum paid for services, or upon a
consideration or in addition to that which would ordinarily be given. Steeple v.
Max Kuner Co., 121 Wash. 47, 208 Pac. 44 (1922), quoting Kennicott v. Wayne
County Sup'rs, 16 Wall. 452, 21 L. Ed. 319 (1873). The contract to pay an
officer additional compensation in the way of a bonus may be either express or
implied. Church v. Harnit, 35 F. (2d) 499 (C.C.A. 6th, 1929). It is well settled
that corporations, generally through their boards of directors, may pay or prom-
